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Abstract
This paper argues that institutional quality has both direct and indirect (moderat-
ing) effects on productivity of countries. These hypotheses are tested using a battery
of institutional proxies (governance, economic freedom, intellectual property rights and
ease of doing business) and two channels for technological spillovers (trade and FDI)
in a panel of developed and transition economies. The results confirm that good insti-
tutions have positive and similar effects on productivity across the board. Moreover,
they moderate the relationship between foreign technological spillovers and productiv-
ity, contingent on the specifics of institutional proxies and countries considered. Thus,
governance, IPR and economic freedom exhibit negative moderation in the case of
transition economies, while easiness of doing business moderates positively this rela-
tionship for both groups of countries. The moderation effects are larger for transition
economies and trade-related spillovers. Overall, these results suggest a trade-off for
transition countries between pursuing institutional upgrades and increasing their gains
from technological spillovers.
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1 Introduction
Innovation and creation of new technologies are often regarded as the most important de-
terminants of productivity improvements and economic growth (Grossman and Helpman,
1991; Romer, 1991; Hall and Jones, 1999). In this framework, technological spillovers from
R&D performed abroad become significant source of growth, especially for developing and
transition countries that are not able to perform significant R&D on their own. Starting with
the seminal work of Coe and Helpman (1995), this literature has documented the impact
of international trade on productivity of countries, while subsequent contributions have fo-
cused on refining methodological issues (Lichtenberg and Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1998;
Lumenga-Neso et al., 2005), improving econometric techniques (Kao et al., 1999; Lee, 2006;
Zhu and Jeon, 2007), exploring different channels for spillovers (Tang and Koveos, 2008;
Le, 2012; Krammer, 2013), and examining these effects in the context of less-developed and
emerging markets (Ciruelos and Wang, 2005; Krammer, 2010; Ang and Madsen, 2012).
While this stream of research provides valuable insights on the function of R&D spillovers
in boosting productivity and growth, a parallel stream of literature postulates the pivotal
role of institutions in determining cross-country and historical economic differentials (Barro,
1991; Rodrik et al., 2004; Bhattacharyya, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2005). Overcoming nu-
merous challenges regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of institutions,
this interdisciplinary line of research has convincingly shown that ”institutions matter” for a
wide array of socio-economic activities within- and across-borders (Granovetter, 1992; North,
1994; Dixit, 2009; Peng, 2008; Ang, 2013). Institutional characteristics impact international
trade flows by determining the amounts (Dollar and Kraay, 2003), channels (He et al., 2013)
and types of goods (Meon and Sekkat, 2008) exchanged by countries. Likewise, institutional
settings create both barriers and opportunities for FDI, as institutional differences between
home and host countries of firms affect a multitude of microeconomic decisions, such as entry
modes (Lu, 2002), staffing (Gaur et al., 2007) and alliances (Park and Ungson, 1997). As a
result, institutional aspects are a strong predictor for the intensity and type of international
activities in a country (Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008), which in turn determine its ability
to benefit from foreign spillovers via trade and FDI.
With few exceptions, the direct and indirect effects of institutions on productivity have
yet to receive significant attention in the literature. Overall, the few studies that have ex-
amined these issues find that countries with better institutions adopt faster technologies,
and exhibit larger productivity growth (Manca, 2010). Economic growth appears intrinsi-
cally linked to institutions, which are able to both retard and encourage the utilization of
new technologies that spur economic performance (Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008). Therefore,
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countries that are less open to international flows of goods and finance due to greater institu-
tional barriers, restrict the adoption of new technologies and tend to allocate a relative small
share of human capital in the R&D sector (Dias and Tebaldi, 2012). In relation to R&D
activities, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2004) argue that besides absorptive capability
and the origin of R&D funds, several institutional factors (the socio-economic objectives of
government support, and the type of public institutions involved) determine the contribu-
tion of knowledge to productivity growth. Finally, institutional elements, legal origins and
subsequent effects (i.e., education policies) appear to interact with productivity and trade
spillovers in developed countries (Coe et al., 2009). All these results suggest important direct
and indirect effects of institutions on both productivity and economic growth.
Despite these recent developments, the literature that links institutions to productivity
and innovation-driven growth still lacks depth in several dimensions. First, the mechanisms
through which institutional settings impact directly and indirectly productivity remain elu-
sive, given the limited scope of research in this area. Trade spills over benefits from new
technologies by opening up channels for communication and transmission of technical knowl-
edge, reducing international duplication of R&D efforts, and providing additional incentives
to innovate via increased competition from foreign products (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).
Likewise, vertical linkages (i.e., customer or supplier relationships with MNEs), demonstra-
tion effects (i.e., imitation, adoption of foreign technologies or processes) and labor turnover
(worker migrating from MNE to domestic firms or new start-ups) are some of the most
common mechanisms through which FDI spillovers affect productivity (Saggi, 2004). How-
ever, all these effects are contingent on the quality of institutions in the host countries, as
the latter shapes both trade and market relationships between foreign and domestic firms,
therefore impacting indirectly the scope of potential spillovers.
Secondly, the types of institutions examined may have different implications for certain
channels of R&D spillovers and performance measures (i.e., growth rates, productivity lev-
els, etc.). For example, Bhattacharyya (2009) suggests that market-creating (i.e., property
rights, contract enforcement) and market-stabilizing (i.e., macro-economic stability policies)
institutions appear to be growth-enhancing, while market-regulating (i.e., preventing market
failures) and market-legitimizing ones (i.e., managing redistribution and social issues) have
no economic impact. Relatedly, Dias and Tebaldi (2012) find that structural institutions
affect long-term economic performance, while political institutions are not correlated with
productivity and long-term growth. Moreover, the link between R&D (or technology) and
institutional aspects remains largely unexplored, except for few qualitative studies. Mokyr
(2008) documents the role of informal institutions in lowering transaction costs and self-
enforcing contracting rules, therefore contributing to the success of the British industrial
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revolution, while Romer (2010) argues that R&D and productivity growth rates are a direct
result of existing institutional arrangements. In parallel, the few empirical studies in this
area document various relationships between national institutions and innovation activities.
On one hand, greater investments in education, strong property rights systems, easiness of
doing business, complemented with measures to promote political and economic freedom,
are positively correlated with technological performance, as proxied by patents (Varsakelis,
2006; Krammer, 2009). On the other, a tightening of property rights impedes the ability
of followers to freely imitate foreign technologies, subsequently reducing their growth rates
(Manca, 2010). Overall, these results suggest that the effects of institutions on R&D activi-
ties, and subsequently on economic performance, vary both across countries and institutional
elements considered.
Thirdly, R&D spillovers through FDI and imports offer great growth opportunities for
developing and emerging market economies, for which theory predicts the largest gains in
terms of growth and catch-up (Furman and Hayes, 2004). These conclusions are matched by
empirical findings in the literature that document the importance of spillovers for less R&D
intensive nations, such as developing (Ciruelos and Wang, 2005) and transition economies
(Krammer, 2010). However, the type of institutional settings in place affects the successful
conversion of these spillovers into productivity and growth improvements (Tebaldi and Elm-
slie, 2008). Therefore, given the existing institutional heterogeneity worldwide (Meyer et al.,
2009), it is important to understand how different institutional features hinder or encourage
the successful absorption of foreign technologies and ultimately contribute to productivity
and economic growth across different types of countries.
Targeting some of the aforementioned limitations, this paper examines the direct and in-
direct (i.e., moderating) impact of institutional quality on domestic productivity in developed
and emerging markets. To this end, it analyzes foreign spillovers via two channels (i.e., in-
ward FDI and imports) and employs several formal institutional proxies and outcomes (e.g.,
intellectual property rights protection, governance, ease of doing business abroad, risk of
expropriation, and economic freedom) to assess the direct and moderating effects of institu-
tions on productivity in a panel of developed countries from Western Europe, and transition
economies from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The latter are particularly appealing to
this line of research for several reasons. These countries have become the subject of a huge
natural experiment in the early 1990s when they have embarked on a long and harsh path
of transition from centralized closed economic systems to free markets. Alongside a painful
restructuring process, which took a significant toll on their well-being, came also significant
benefits from opening up to trade and foreign direct investments (Damijan et al. 2003a, b).
In parallel, institutional reforms were put in place and transition countries started to rebuild
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their systems, however with mixed results (Beck and Laeven, 2006). Despite significant signs
of recovery and growth over the last decade, their performance in terms of trade, inward FDI,
institutional reforms and productivity levels remains quite heterogeneous.
This work proposes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it advances
theoretical arguments for the direct and indirect effects (via spillovers) of institutions on
productivity and economic growth. This framework incorporates two channels for spillovers
of technological nature, namely FDI and trade related spillovers, consistent with the increas-
ing importance of capital and trade flows worldwide. Second, the empirical tests carried
out in the paper employ different institutional proxies to allow for heterogeneous effects of
institutions on both productivity and R&D spillovers. To this end, it considers the direct ef-
fects of intellectual property rights protection, governance quality, ease of doing business and
economic freedom on productivity and moderating ones via trade and FDI spillovers. Third,
this study provides a comparative analysis of 47 developed and transition countries of the
impact of R&D spillovers on productivity and their interactions with existing institutional
settings. As a result of a long process of transition started in the early 1990s, economies
from Eastern European and Central Asia exhibit significant heterogeneity in terms of insti-
tutional quality (Meyer, 2009), innovative and productive performance (Krammer, 2009), as
well as ability to benefit from foreign R&D spillovers (Krammer, 2010), which makes them
a propitious ground for testing these hypotheses.
Next section provides an overview of the literature on international R&D spillovers and
institutions, innovation and growth, proposing theoretical hypotheses for the role of differ-
ent institutional settings on productivity and their interaction with R&D spillovers. Section
3 presents several stylized facts related to trade, FDI, and the institutional environment
in transition countries, while Section 4 lays out the theoretical model, which will serve as a
backbone for the empirical estimations, and summarizes the main features of the dataset em-
ployed. Section 5 describes the econometric methodology, issues and results of the analyses,
while Section 6 presents conclusions and suggestions for future work in this area.
2 Literature review and theoretical background
2.1 International R&D spillovers
R&D investments produce new knowledge about production inputs and processes, which
contribute directly to quality and productivity enhancements. Subsequently, endogenous
growth theory sees R&D as a significant source of economic growth, suggesting that in order
to achieve superior levels of productivity and income per capita, one needs to invest in
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R&D as a way to develop new processes and technologies (Romer, 1991; Hall and Jones,
1999). However, it is clear that the benefits of R&D activities cannot be fully internalized
for several reasons pertaining to the intrinsic characteristics of knowledge (Griliches, 1979).
The resulting R&D spillovers are defined as externalities, which arise when economic benefits
of one’s R&D ”spill” over to another’s activities, either as a results of competitive pressures
(rent spillovers) or imperfect appropriability of technical information (knowledge spillovers).
Regardless of the conceptual approach, in practice, distinguishing between the two is difficult,
given their significant overlap and the inherent measurement problems. Thus, most studies
adopt a general concept of spillovers for analysis and focus on the channels through which
this phenomenon occurs as well as its subsequent contribution to productivity and growth
(Krammer, 2013).
Within this large stream of work, trade has been postulated as an important channel for
transmission of technological information (Coe and Helpman, 1995). Theoretical arguments
suggest that trade, especially imports, facilitate the spill over of benefits from foreign R&D
efforts through several mechanisms. First, through trade, domestic firms get acquainted
with technical characteristics of imported goods, which opens up possibilities for imitation
of foreign technologies for productivity and performance enhancements (Keller and Shiue,
2008). Second, international trade caters to a greater variety of intermediary inputs with
different technological levels for the domestic production process, which in turn, increase
technological content and value-added of products (Unel, 2008). Finally, trade opens up
channels for communication and transmission of knowledge of technical nature, therefore
stimulating international collaboration and reducing duplication of R&D efforts worldwide
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Empirical findings confirm a positive effect of trade on
productivity in both developing and developed nations (Kao et al., 1999; Lichtenberg and
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1998; Crispolti and Marconi, 2005; Lee, 2006). Moreover,
recent studies employing sector-level data reach a similar conclusion, namely that trade
activities are one of the main avenues for spillovers (Acharya and Keller, 2007; Mancusi,
2008, Eberhardt et al., 2012).
In addition to trade flows, foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been established as an
important channel for spillovers driven by superior endowments of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) in terms of managerial, innovative and staffing capabilities. As a result, several the-
oretical mechanisms for FDI spillovers have been proposed in the literature (Saggi, 2004):
vertical linkages (between firms and their customers, respectively their suppliers), demon-
stration effects (commonly taking the form of adoption or imitation of technologies developed
by MNEs) and labor turnover (employees that leave MNEs for domestic firms or new start-
ups, and take with them tacit knowledge regarding the business). All these spillovers yield
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significant horizontal and vertical effects on productivity of domestic firms in these mar-
kets (Saggi 2004). Moreover, consistent with the catching-up effect, these effects tend to
be larger for developing countries, where differences in productivity between domestic firms
and incoming multinationals is much higher than that of firms from industrialized countries
(Krammer, 2010). In terms of empirical findings, most studies provide overwhelming support
for the existence and the positive effect of FDI spillovers on domestic productivity. Despite
the skepticism of early work in this area (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Djankov and Hoekman
2000), most of the recent studies document strong positive FDI spillovers from foreign R&D
(Damijan et al. 2003a; Griffith 2004; Haskel et al. 2007; Krammer, 2010). These effects
are commonly examined for inward FDI flows, although few studies present also evidence
of ”learning by investing” (i.e., outward FDI) for developed nations (Van Pottelsberghe and
Lichtenberg 2001).
2.2 Institutions, spillovers and productivity
Institutions have an essential role of supporting the proper functioning of a society by reduc-
ing the risks associated with market transactions. Commonly defined as human constraints
of political, economic or social nature, institutions are responsible for shaping societal in-
teractions (North 1990). As a result, institutional mechanisms are reflected in the political,
social and economic context that affects the manner in which firms from different countries
interact with each other. This line of thought has produced several streams of research across
different disciplines that investigate the role of institutions in economic, social and political
international interactions.
Although scholars across these disciplines employ broad definitions of institutions, they
hold different views regarding the operationalization of the concept. For example, following
North (1990), economics researchers conceptualize institutions as having two components (in-
formal and the formal ones) and tend to pay significant attention to the latter (Williamson,
2000). While informal institutions are derived from the cultural primers of countries and
describe social interactions and patterns of behavior (i.e., trust, collaboration or subordi-
nation), formal institutions manifest themselves through rules and regulations that target
mostly legal and economic issues (Peng, 2000). In contrast, those that adopt a more sociolog-
ical perspective employ a framework that accommodates three institutional pillars, namely
cognitive, normative and regulatory (Scott, 2001). In this view, informal institutional aspects
are separated into normative and cognitive elements, which are tacit and deeply embedded
in a normal functioning of a society. These are commonly perceived as the socio-cultural
elements of a country (Gaur et al., 2007). The third (regulatory) component includes formal
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institutional elements that are codified and promote certain behaviors among individuals
and firms (Scott, 2001).
Researchers in international management have mostly used institutional theory (DiMag-
gio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990; Scott, 2001) to explain different microeconomic (i.e.,
firm-specific) aspects. Institutional similarity or dissimilarity between home and host coun-
tries of multinational firms (MNEs) influences a wide array of firm decisions, including entry
modes (Lu, 2002), staffing (Gaur et al., 2007), alliance decisions (Park and Ungson, 1997),
location (Xu and Shenkar, 2002) or export strategies (Hu et al., 2013). Thus, a general
prescription of this stream of research is that greater institutional distance, or difference
between home and host countries of MNEs, makes it less appealing and more difficult to
operate in these environments.
Oppositely, the bulk of economic studies that focus on institutional issues targets a
couple of key macroeconomic (i.e., country-specific) variables. Overall, these studies employ
institutional arguments to explain historical growth performance and existing differences in
per capita income across countries. Barro (1991) suggests that growth rates are positively
related to political stability and inversely related to market distortions. Rodrik et al. (2004)
posit that institutional quality ”trumps everything else” (i.e., geography, trade) in explaining
differences in income per capita. Subscribing to the same idea, Acemoglu et al. (2005) make
a strong case for the role of economic institutions in explaining differences in economic
development. They also develop a framework that includes both economic and political
institutions, which interact with each other in shaping economic outcomes, social decisions
and distribution of resources. Finally, Ang (2013) shows that the historical effect of early
stages of development on current economic performance works also through institutional
quality.
Aside from their effects on economic growth and productivity, institutions have been also
connected recently with innovation and R&D activities, both theoretically and empirically.
Tebaldi and Elmslie (2008) propose an endogenous growth model which details the role of
institutions in the economy. Their model predicts that the long-run growth of an economy is
intrinsically linked to institutional quality, which in turn stimulates the efficient utilization
of newly invented inputs and an optimal allocation of human capital in the R&D sector.
Furthermore, Dias and Tebaldi (2012) take these arguments to the data and confirm that
deep (historically rooted) institutional aspects of countries are responsible for long-term
trends in productivity and growth. In relation to R&D activities and the role of spillovers,
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2004) argue that, besides absorptive capability and the origin
of R&D funds, several institutional factors (the socio-economic objectives of government
support, and the type of public institutions involved) determine the extent to which each
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source of knowledge contributes to productivity growth. Finally, in an extension of their
1995 seminal paper, Coe et al. (2009) test the effects of several institutional variables on a
sample of developed countries. Their results generally suggest that OECD countries with
stronger institutional environments are able to both perform more R&D and benefit more
from foreign spillovers.
Despite these recent developments, the literature on productivity and technology-driven
growth has yet to fully incorporate the role of institutions in this framework, lacking depth
in several dimensions. First, while the initial empirical inquiries into the interplay between
institutions, technical knowledge from R&D, and subsequent productivity growth suggest
a complex relationship (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2004; Coe et al., 2009; Dias and
Tebaldi, 2012), this work remains silent in explaining the mechanisms through which insti-
tutions operate. Second, the complexity of institutional regimes, which may include very
different types of institutions, requires a comprehensive examination of the interactions be-
tween productivity, spillover and institutions across multiple dimensions and channels of
spillovers. Previous studies linking directly economic growth to institutions have shown that
only some of them can be associated with growth (Bhattacharyya, 2009; Dias and Tebaldi,
2012), raising similar concerns regarding the indirect effect of institutions via spillovers.
For example, as property rights regulations may affect the appeal of a country for foreign
investors given the higher transaction costs and appropriation concerns, reducing the poten-
tial spillovers it receives via this channel, it may not be relevant for the effect of potential
spillovers from imports. Thirdly, the relevance of institutions is conditioned by the inclusion
of less developed and developing countries in these estimations. Most studies on R&D and
productivity growth have difficulties in establishing a causal relationship between the two
due to endogeneity issues. These concerns are further inflated upon introduction of institu-
tions in these models and the lack of variation in the institutional quality by including only
on developed (e.g., OECD) nations (Glaeser et al., 2004). Focusing on these limitations, next
section proposes several theoretical arguments for the direct and indirect role of institutional
quality on productivity.
2.3 Hypotheses
Institutional quality is closely associated with political and economic governance, as well
as interactions among different societal members (North, 1990). As a result, institutions
can directly promote or retard economic development through several mechanisms. First,
having good institutions provides incentive for certain types of activities (i.e., productive
and innovative activities with high private and social returns), while poor institutions allow
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for rent-seeking and non-productive activities that yield little social and productive improve-
ments. Societies that are stuck with low-quality institutional settings fail to achieve economic
growth, as they are unable to capture productivity gains coming from the specialization and
division of labor (North, 1990). Thus, a critical factor that may spur their development
trajectories is the adoption of strong institutions that emphasize freedom (e.g., economic,
political, religious etc.) alongside policies to develop human capital -e.g., focusing on edu-
cation, skill formation- (Lee and Kim, 2009). As a result, the development of democratic
institutions is regarded as a key driver of sustainable growth (Berg et al., 2012).
Moreover, institutional quality is associated with innovation, in the form of new prod-
uct and processes, which affects both productivity and value-added of economic activities
(Lundvall, 2007). An example of these effects is the existence of strong intellectual property
rights (IPR), which are defined as a formal institutional component that grants monopoly
rights to inventors over the commercial use of their inventions within a limited time period
(commonly around 20 years). Strong IPR legislation and enforcement is correlated with
higher levels of domestic innovation, as firms are able to capture a greater share of the
benefits stemming from internal R&D or innovations (Park, 2008). Moreover, for develop-
ing countries with lower IPR standards, strengthening these laws will reduce appropriation
concerns of multinationals regarding their proprietary technologies, resulting in greater in-
ternational interactions, given the lower monitoring and protection costs of such activities
(Roy and Oliver, 2009). Finally, IPR facilitates the transfer of technologies across countries
by creating and supporting the existence of markets for technologies, in which firms are able
to capitalize on their knowledge-intensive assets but also acquire new ones that will comple-
ment their existing competences (Arora et al., 2001). Hence, better IPR regulations facilitate
different international interactions such as FDI (Branstatter et al., 2006), commercialization
of foreign technologies (Gans et al., 2008), and firm collaborations (Oxley, 1999). Greater
inflows of FDI as well as international collaborations raise the level of competition in domes-
tic markets, which in turn stimulates firms to undertake more R&D or acquire technology
from foreign sources in order to compete successfully in their home-markets. This ultimately
results in productivity enhancements for domestic firms and host countries.
Likewise, other elements of institutions have been associated with better innovative and
economic performance. Among them, governance represents the institutional manifestation
of authority within a country, including a wide array of activities such as the government
selection, monitoring and replacement processes, its capacity to formulate and implement
effectively sound policies, the respect of citizens rights and social interactions among them
and other entities of the state (Kaufmann et al., 2008). In terms of empirical findings, good
governance is associated with higher domestic and foreign investments (Mauro, 1995), differ-
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ences in growth rates (Posner, 1975), innovation (Mokyr, 1990) as well as firm-level decisions
(Roy and Oliver, 2009). I argue that governance will affect positively productivity through
several mechanisms: stronger rule of law will insure the protection of property, cut down
transaction costs, provide additional means to secure financial resources and increase the im-
pact of the existing ones by reducing governmental inefficiency and corruption. As a result,
good governance promotes more efficient markets, which in turn increases productivity.
Economic freedom is another identification of a set of institutional characteristics that
induces an efficient allocation of resources in a country and smoothens interactions between
different economic agents, being firms, individuals and public officials. One should distin-
guish economic freedom from political and civil one, commonly encompassed in the concept
of governance. Following the classical liberal thought these institutional characteristics focus
on the stability and security of private property (but also freedom to save, change jobs, retain
income, etc.), the size of the government (implicitly its power to intervene in the economy),
access to sound money (i.e., low and predictable inflation), openness to trade and invest-
ments, as well as an optimal level of regulation in the economy for spurring entrepreneurial
and innovative endeavors. Overall, studies report a positive relationship between economic
freedom and growth rates (Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson, 2004; Ali and Crane, 2002) as
well as entrepreneurial activities (Nystrom, 2008). In relation to productivity, different insti-
tutionalized measures of economic freedom reduce transaction costs in the market, stimulate
entrepreneurial experimentation and innovation, help allocate efficiently financial resources
and open up new opportunities for domestic firms (Bjornskov and Foss, 2010). As a result,
these mechanisms yield a greater variety of available inputs for the production process, which
will increase productivity.
Finally, the ”ease of doing business” refers to the ability of different regulatory institu-
tional aspects in a country to be conducive to the starting and operating of a local firm.
Therefore, a high ranking in this respect implies less effort (time and costs) to operate a
business, and countries seek improvements (i.e., new laws and regulations or revise existing
ones) in these areas in order to attract foreign investors and promote a successful national
image. As much, previous studies have linked these institutional aspects with increased
MNE activities (Wei, 2000; Disdier and Mayer, 2004) and development of an entrepreneurial
culture (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001), all with immediate consequences for domestic in-
novation (Krammer, 2009). As a result, countries that adopt higher standards in terms
of pro-business market reforms will benefit from more innovation from both domestic and
foreign sources, which will translate into superior productivity levels as compared to lower
institutional quality environments as a result of fewer pro-business reforms.
Overall, better formal institutions create a more favorable environment for new, innova-
11
tive activities, which result in productivity enhancements and superior growth rates. Simi-
larly, institutional quality attracts more inflows of FDI and trade into a country with positive
consequences on productivity and growth. Given all these arguments, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Institutional quality will have a positive impact on domestic productivity.
While the direct effect of institutions on productivity and growth is valid for all types
of countries, its magnitude is contingent on the level of economic development (Meyer and
Sinani, 2009). Hence, firms in countries with relatively lower institutional quality will have
greater incentives to improve their productivity via domestic (i.e., internal R&D) and for-
eign (i.e., acquire technology or collaborative R&D) sources, as a result of improvements in
institutional settings. Oppositely, firms in countries with medium and high levels of institu-
tional quality benefit already from a good environment, one that stimulates their domestic
innovative capabilities and the amount of trade and FDI exposure they get. In these cases,
the effects of institutional quality on the contribution of spillovers to domestic productivity
will be lower, as firms are already maximizing their productivity via technologies acquired
through in-house R&D efforts or via external sources (e.g., licensing, international R&D al-
liances, etc.). Thus, it is likely that the direct effects of institutional quality on growth and
productivity will be larger for countries with lower quality institutional environments than
otherwise. Hence:
Hypothesis 2: The effect of institutional quality on productivity will be greater in less
developed economies than in developed ones.
Besides the direct impact on productivity and growth of a country, institutions also af-
fect indirectly the efficiency of R&D spillovers on productivity through several mechanisms.
First, the amount of potential R&D spillovers is largely conditioned by certain characteris-
tics of the local environment. Among these characteristics, institutional traits are especially
salient for both FDI and trade activities of firms (Lu, 2002; Hu et al., 2013). As a result,
institutional characteristics and specifically, institutional differences between home and host
countries of firms operating internationally, is a crucial determinant of what (e.g., exports,
greenfield investments, joint-ventures, etc.) and where (location) firms operate internation-
ally (Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008). Therefore, higher institutional quality (i.e., closer to
the ”standard” of a developed economy) will increase the efficiency of economic activities in
a country as a result of institutional proximity (familiarity) of host and home countries of
economic agents (firms, individuals). In turn, this yields lower transaction and coordination
costs that enhance the effect of spillovers on domestic productivity.
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Second, institutional characteristics of countries also affect the type and composition
of FDI and trade inflows a country experiences. For instance, manufactured exports are
positively correlated with the quality of institutions, while non-manufactured exports are
not (Meon and Sakkat, 2008). Similarly, institutions appear to have a consistent influence
on FDI in manufacturing and service sectors, while in the case of primary sectors (e.g.,
agriculture, oil, gas and mining) institutional quality appears not to affect inward FDI (Ali
et al., 2010). Hence, countries that exhibit a production mix geared towards manufacturing
and services are more likely to increase their intake of traded goods and foreign investments,
which in turn will affect positively the impact of spillovers on domestic productivity.
Third, institutional characteristics moderate the effects of spillovers on productivity by
affecting the depth and scope of the channels through which these occur. Similar to invest-
ments in R&D or skilled (trained) human capital, institutional progress stimulates both the
exposure to and the chance of success for absorption of foreign technologies. Therefore, in-
tuitively, they can be conceptualized as a component of the absorptive capacity of a country.
High quality institutions open up countries to receive more inflows of FDI and trade that
carry significant technological content (Meon and Sekkat, 2008; Ali et al., 2010). These flows
will increase the domestic exposure to foreign technologies through a variety of mechanisms
such as imports of intermediates, licensing agreements, demonstration effects, vertical link-
ages, and labor turnover (Saggi, 2004). Overall, open (trade and investment) regimes are
more appealing to foreign firms and investors since domestic market size and characteristics
are less of a constraint for inward FDI (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). As a result, such high
quality institutional environments will attract global players that produce and adopt the
latest available technologies, therefore increasing the technological exposure (and spillovers)
of these host countries (Meyer and Sinani, 2009). Similarly, other institutional standards
have been argued to affect firms’ capacity to absorb technologies, hence increase the effect
of spillovers. In a recent study Hale and Long (2011) argue that the rigidity of labor market
regulations (wage constraints in particular) determine the absorptive capacity of firms by
capping their level of skills, while (Alfaro et al., 2010) show that financial institutions are an
important contributor to the successful absorption of spillovers.
These moderating effects of institutions on the relationship between technological spillovers
and productivity can be detailed across different institutional proxies. First, countries that
are able to improve their governance systems (e.g., rule of law, bureaucratic inefficiency, gov-
ernment effectiveness) are likely to receive larger inflows of FDI and domestic investments
(Gani, 2007). Moreover, the composition of these inflows will be different from that of a
low-governance country, incorporating more technology-intensive assets and investments as
compared to the latter (Smarzynska-Javorcik, 2004). In turn, this will increase the potential
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effect of technological spillovers on domestic productivity. Second, institutional regimes with
high economic freedom are appealing for both foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs
alike by granting lower levels of regulations, security of property rights, and enhanced flex-
ibility in these markets (Gwartney et al., 2004). This will attract high-technology MNEs
and stimulate smart-growth strategies as a result of domestic entrepreneurial developments
(Foray et al., 2009), both which will reinforce the positive effects of spillovers on productiv-
ity. Thirdly, stronger IPR regimes will provide more incentives for foreign firms to pursue
technology-intensive projects in host countries, which will result in greater potential for
technological spillovers with trade and FDI activities (Coe et al., 2009). Moreover, they also
stimulate innovation and investment in technologies by domestic firms, as stronger IPR will
make more likely that these investments will pay off in terms of competitive advantage in
the markets (Gans et al., 2008). Finally, pro-business market reforms (or the easiness of do-
ing business aspects of institutions) impact positively the relationship between technological
spillovers and productivity of countries by strengthening their national systems of inno-
vation and encouraging the absorption and diffusion of new technical knowledge (Barbossa
and Faria, 2011). These institutional reforms targeting business formation and operation are
different from targeted innovation policy measures, and contribute indirectly to technical-
driven productivity enhancements via a stronger national system of innovation as a result
of more foreign investors and venture capitalists, technological partnerships with MNEs,
entrepreneurial incentives for universities and individuals (Allard et al., 2012).
To sum up, I posit that countries with higher institutional standards will likely strengthen
their national innovation systems, provide stronger incentives for innovation-driven produc-
tivity growth, attract larger inflows of FDI and trade, and boost their capacity to convert
technological spillovers into productivity gains. Hence:
Hypothesis 3a: The effect of R&D spillovers on productivity is positively moderated by
institutional quality.
However, institutional quality can also reduce the effect of technological spillovers on
productivity for several reasons. First, countries with large domestic markets and signifi-
cant resources are still able to attract significant FDI and trade inflows (and subsequently
spillovers) despite having low quality institutions. For instance, the former Soviet economies
are among the top destinations for both FDI and trade flows due to their significant resource
endowments and infrastructure (Kinoshita and Campos, 2003). More generally, Asiedu and
Lien (2011) show that the importance of institutions in promoting FDI depends on the
value of minerals and oil in a country’s export basket. Hence, countries with low-quality
institutions but significant resource endowments are perceived as yielding high returns of
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investments, given the exclusivity of exploitation and splitting of profits to a small exclu-
sive elite group (e.g., oligarchs). In these cases, good institutions, regardless of their nature
(governance, property rights, etc.) chips away from these rents and may actually deter the
appeal of investments and trade activities with these partners. Furthermore, strengthening
existing IPR regimes may actually reduce domestic productivity by promoting an ”intellec-
tual monopoly” that is detrimental for innovation in less developed countries (Boldrin and
Levine, 2008), and biased towards high-tech industries (i.e., pharmaceutical, biotechnology,
electronics) that are not representative for the industrial mix of these countries (Hall, 2007).
As a result, institutional quality may have antagonistic effects on the relationship between
technological spillovers and domestic productivity.
Second, lower institutional standards grant governments more leverage in dealing with
MNEs and increasing the potential for spillovers throughout the economy via different pol-
icy measures. Thus, in countries with less stringent institutions, governments can set up
agreements with foreign firms through which domestic firms can access foreign sources of
technologies freely or at a low cost. A good example of this is the ”quid pro quo” policy
of China, which requires foreign firms to transfer technology to Chinese firms in return for
market access (Holmes et al., 2013). While this results in significant technological gains
for Chinese firms that translate directly into productivity improvements and higher rates of
innovation, it has also leads to lower flows of FDI between China and developed countries
with significant technological assets. Any improvement in institutional quality, being gov-
ernance, IPR, business reforms or freedom, would alter this balance of power between host
country government and the MNE in the favor of the latter, resulting in less control and
free technological benefits for domestic firms and individuals. Likewise,another mechanism
through which governments can affect the magnitude and of technological spillovers are the
institutional regulations and treatment of foreign firms. For example, Du et al. (2011) find
out that foreign firms that receive investment subsidies generate positive spillovers, whereas
those that do not receive these subsidies generate negative spillovers. The effects of these
spillovers is further enhanced if the foreign firm is enjoying tax exemptions. All this evidence
suggests that lower institutional standards can be successfully harnessed by governments in
less developed countries in order to maximize potential technological spillovers from inter-
national interactions throughout the economy. Oppositely, adhering to higher institutional
standards will prevent governments from undertaking such actions, therefore reducing the
scope for potential spillovers.
Finally, institutional quality reduces the scope of trade and FDI spillovers by affecting
the channels through which these occur. When institutional quality is low, domestic firms
are able to access and often imitate foreign technologies, which benefits their productivity.
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Improvements in formal institutions (i.e., better regulations, stronger IPR protection and
applicability of the law - governance-) diminish significantly firms’ opportunities to access
technical knowledge and benefit from demonstration effects, as these are shielded against
unlawful imitation through patent and copyright laws that are properly enforced. Chen and
Puttitanun (2005) show that developing countries benefit from lower IPR standards as they
are in an early stage of technological development. Therefore, countries with no significant
R&D activities benefit more from having low-quality institutional settings than otherwise, as
they are able to internalize more benefits from foreign technology sources. Moreover, having
higher institutional standards in other areas (e.g., labor, competition, or environmental
issues) reduces significantly the appeal of developing nations as a destination for FDI, as one
of its major drivers resides in cost-seeking motives (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). An economy
with greater trade and FDI openness might attract outward-oriented foreign firms that are
interested in international distribution and marketing, rather than inward-oriented firms that
bring new technologies to host countries (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). As a result, many
MNEs will use developing countries as an export platform rather than a development one,
which will constrict the amount of spillovers they receive. Finally, increased institutional
standards in the financial domain may have negative effects on domestic firms’ access to
funds impeding their development and capacity to benefit from foreign spillovers. Lastly,
better financial institutions may actually increase competition for financial resources in these
markets, further deterring domestic firms from investing in R&D and skill upgrading as a way
to improve their capacity to benefit from spillovers. Improvements in financial institutions
may result in a crowding out of domestic firms by MNEs which will trigger negative spillovers
on domestic productivity of these countries. For instance, Agarwal et al. (2011) find that
spillovers are lower or even negative in the case of Chinese manufacturing firms with financial
constraints, while Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) argue that firms that experience liquidity
constraints are more likely to become suppliers of multinationals rather than competitors in
domestic markets.
Overall, higher institutional quality implies less room for imitation of foreign technologies,
lower bargaining power in interactions with foreign firms, and negative effects from compe-
tition and access to finance vis-a-vis multinational firms, all of which reduce the potential of
foreign technological spillovers. Therefore, we have the competing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of R&D spillovers on productivity is negatively moderated by
institutional quality.
Local firms with exposure to imported goods and foreign partners (via FDI, M&As, JVs,
etc.) are able to learn from them via several mechanisms such as vertical links, demonstration
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effects and labor turnover (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Saggi, 2004). However, the extent of
these learning effects depends on the local catch-up potential, commonly referred to as
absorptive capacity: those firms and countries which are relatively backward (far from the
technological frontier of the world-i.e., the state of the art in terms of innovation and new
technologies) will have the greatest potential for productivity improvements by imitating
or copying productivity-enhancing products, processes or practices. Oppositely, firms and
countries that are closer to this frontier would gain much less from such imitation, given their
relative advanced position, which would require more R&D efforts to advance significantly
their current productivity levels. Thus, the potential for foreign technological spillovers is
enhanced by the existence of greater technology-gaps (Wang and Blomstrom, 1992) that
are characteristic to developing and transition economies. Moreover, contingent on existing
absorptive capabilities in the form of human capital and knowledge stocks (Krammer, 2010),
these technological laggards can benefit significantly in terms of productivity improvements.
Despite its strong theoretical arguments, the above technology-gap hypothesis is still
not widely embraced in the literature, given its underlying assumptions (Meyer and Sinani,
2009). One such assumption is concerned with the nature of the knowledge, commonly
perceived as a quasi public good, which is difficult to prevent from diffusing and protect
against unlawful imitation or reverse-engineering by domestic firms. Such conditions apply
to certain standardized technologies and management practices, but however, not to the
core-competences and technological assets of foreign MNEs. Similarly, the degree of techno-
logical embeddedness of imported products and intermediate goods presents finite options
for imitation and reverse engineering. All these arguments suggest that spillovers are likely
to occur under specific conditions. These conditions are best met in less developed economies
that exhibit looser institutional environments and greater technological gaps vis-a-vis trade
and investment partners. Therefore I posit that:
Hypothesis 4: The moderation effect of institutional quality is greater in less developed
economies than in developed ones.
3 Stylized facts about trade, FDI and institutional qual-
ity in transition economies
While most studies on foreign R&D spillovers and productivity are centered around OECD
(developed) nations, the catching-up hypothesis (i.e., developing nations that are further
behind in terms of income for capita are more likely to benefit from these spillovers and
grow faster, conditional on their absorptive capacity) and existing institutional heterogeneity
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Figure 1: Factor use for imports of transition countries
Source: own calculations using data from IMF DOTS. Note: CEE-Central and Eastern Europe; SEE-South Eastern Europe;
CIS-Commonwealth of Indepedent States
suggest that these research questions are especially salient for less developed nations. Among
them, transition countries from Central Asia and Eastern Europe are particularly interesting
for several reasons. Most of these countries have made significant improvements over the past
20 years in aligning their social, political and economic institutions to the rest of the world,
a process known as the transition period. However, they still exhibit large differences both
compared to the average institutional quality of an OECD country and within their peer-
group, due to economic, social and geographic factors. As a result of the reforms undertaken,
a surge of trade and FDI flows has become visible also in this part of the world. The following
paragraphs will describe the nature and scope of these international flows in parallel with
improvements signaled in terms of institutional settings from 1990 to the present.
Over the past decades, trade has grown faster in transition countries than elsewhere in
the world, in a rush to fill the void created by the decades of communist isolationism. Thus,
the exports of transition countries tripled and their imports increased two and a half times.
However, the fine details are less optimistic since most of these developments are driven by
Central and East European (CEE) success stories. Meanwhile, trade in the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) is taking place mostly through the regional partnerships and re-
mains heavily polarized around the Russian Federation (Broadman, 2005). As a result, with
the exception of Russia and Ukraine, all other CIS countries have not become more globally
integrated over the last 20 years. Overall, there is a clear trend towards increased regional-
ism, and all transition countries (CIS, SEE and CEE) are trading more among themselves
in 2000s compared to the 1990s. Moreover, there is a clear polarization of trade relations
for these countries. For the SEEs and CEEs this implies more imports from the European
Union (EU-15), while for CISs the concentration remains geared towards Russia. Finally,
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Figure 2: FDI intensity in transition countries
Source: own calculations using data from World Development Indicators. Note: The indicator is computed as the average
inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP across time and countries
consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, capital and high skilled intensive products dom-
inate imports, and their shares have increased substantially in all transition countries (see
Figure 1) suggesting greater potential for spillovers on domestic productivity.
In parallel, FDI inflows have followed a similar path. Increasingly, Eastern European
countries have become quite successful in attracting foreign direct investment, as reflected
by their larger inward FDI flows and stocks (see Figure 2). Until recently, the most popu-
lar targets were Central European countries, namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
However, in the last years this trend is slowly changing. For example, according to UNC-
TAD (2007) in 2006 the inflows grew by 68 % to $69 billion, and the most targeted countries
were resource-intensive (Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Ukraine) and new EU members
(Romania and Bulgaria). This trend has continued also in the post-crisis period. Over-
all, FDI inflows have a stable share of 5% of the GDP, while the FDI stocks in absolute
numbers have grown significantly. In terms of sectoral composition of foreign investments,
manufacturing (35% of the total), financial intermediation (22%) followed by transport and
communication (12%) and wholesale and retail activities (11%) are prominent in Central
and South Eastern Europe. The top investors in the region are West European countries
like Germany, Netherlands or Austria, seconded by the USA. Outward flows from the region
have also surged in the last years, mostly due to the expansion of Russian multinationals
seeking key investments abroad.
In terms of institutions, these countries have made significant progress through a long
series of reforms. However, despite their impressive progress in the post-Soviet period, the
average development level of institutions in the region is weaker than that of other countries
with similar income levels. Even within transition economies the differences between Central
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Figure 3: Average quality of governance in transition countries
Source: own calculations using data from World Governance Indicators. Note: The indicator is computed as the average
inward governance score across six dimensions
European, South Eastern European and the CIS countries remain blatant (Figure 3) and
of similar magnitude across different institutional elements. These suggest significant struc-
tural differences across transition countries in terms of institutional efficiency and how they
operate. While scholars argue that institutional quality is determined by democracy and
political reforms, other exogenous factors (e.g., history, geography, resource endowments,
proximity to the EU) are known to trigger institutional change. Although these factors
are fixed or difficult to change, their effect can be counteracted or complemented through
policy measures to support international integration, political reform and increased political
transparency (EBRD, 2013).
The economic and financial crisis, which has started in 2008 for most of these transition
economies has impacted severely their growth potentials. Moreover, the effects of the crisis
were transmitted through trade and the financial channels (Gardo and Martin, 2010) that
ultimately affected also their gain from spillovers via these channels. First, capital inflows
dropped drastically, crippling significantly the domestic growth perspective. As a result most
of these economies experienced significant disruptions, beyond that of other emerging mar-
kets such as India or China (Fidrmuc and Mayer, 2010). Second, this financial tightening has
resulted in a contraction of trade flows, both through decreases in imports (less purchasing
power) and exports (less demand from their main markets like the EU). Together, these
developments have also reduced the potential of technological spillovers in these economies.
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4 Method
4.1 Theoretical model
Following my theoretical conjectures in Section 2, I propose a model that accommodates
the role of institutions in an endogenous growth framework. This model draws on Broda
et al. (2006) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), extending their approach to incorporate
interactions with institutional settings. I assume that the world is composed of n countries
and that each of these economies utilizes labor, capital and intermediate inputs to produce
a unique final good that is sold both in domestic and foreign markets. This is produced
competitively in the final goods sector governed by the following production function:
Y = (AL)1−θDθ, 0 < θ < 1 (1)
where L is the labor input, A is the quality changes over time and D is the range of
intermediate inputs that follow this specification:
D =
∫ N
0
[xΨj dj]
1/Ψ,Ψ > 1 (2)
where Ψ measures the elasticity of substitution between various inputs of variety j, and
N represents different varieties of inputs available at a certain time. However, in equilibrium
, xj would equal x, and manufacturers would employ equal quantities of each input. Thus,
the production function would be given by:
Y = (AL)1−θ(NxΨ)θ/Ψ (3)
Furthermore, let each intermediate input x be produced at a one-for-one ration with
capital as in Broda et al.(2006). Subsequently, the total amount of capital (K) employed in
production equals K=Nx. Substituting that in (3) yields:
Y = (AL)1−θKθN(
1−Ψ
Ψ )θ (4)
Thus, total factor productivity is given by:
F = A1−θN(
1−Ψ
Ψ )θ (5)
However, the number of intermediate varieties depend on both domestic (Sd) and foreign
sources of technology (Sf ), as suggested by Coe and Helpman (1995):
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F = A1−θ(ζdSd)(
1−Ψ
Ψ )θ(ζfS
f )(
1−Ψ
Ψ )θ (6)
yielding the baseline model:
logF = η + δd logS
d + δf logS
f (7)
where δd =
1−Ψ
Ψ
θ log ζd and δf =
1−Ψ
Ψ
θ log ζf
This specification can be extended further to include the channel of foreign direct invest-
ment as a source of potential spillovers:
logFit = ηit + δd logS
d
it + δfm logS
fm
it + δff logS
ff
it , (8)
where Sfmit represents the trade related spillovers and S
ff
it the FDI specific ones.
Finally, I allow for domestic institutional quality to have a direct impact on productivity
and also act as a moderator for spillovers:
logFit = ηit+δd logS
d
it+δfm logS
fm
it +δff logS
ff
it +γit+δ
γ
fm(γit∗logSfmit )+δγff (γit∗logSffit ) (9)
where γit represents a measure of institutional quality, ηit captures both cross-country specific
effects and exogenous technological progress over time. This model will be used as a base for
my econometric estimations, which will include several institutional proxies and distinguish
these effects across a sample of developed and transition economies.
4.2 Data and variables
To test the direct and moderating impacts of institutional quality on productivity, I employ
a panel of 47 countries over the period 1990 to 2009. This includes 20 developed Western
European and 27 transitional countries: 19 from Central and Eastern Europe and 8 from
Central Asia (all former USSR states). The analysis is confined to the period 1990 to 2009 as
for most transition countries 1990 is the first year of economic and political freedom, following
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Prior to 1990, these countries were not open to trade or FDI.
Thus, the inward flows of foreign goods and investments, which I postulate to carry R&D
spillovers were mostly non-existent before 1990. To compute the technological spillovers I
rely on R&D investment statistics for 25 OECD countries, which account for more than 82
percent of the world’s R&D investment according to my computations. These countries will
constitute the main source of spillovers for both Western European and transition countries.
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4.3 Measuring productivity and spillovers
Total factor productivity
GDP (in millions of 1990 PPP US$) and employment data (in thousands) are from the Total
Economy Database (Groningen Growth and Development Centre). The physical capital
stock values are computed using aggregated investment shares as a percentage of GDP
(from the World Penn Tables 6.2) For computations of the capital stock in year t, I use the
Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM).
R&D stocks
Domestic R&D stocks are computed using the gross domestic R&D investments (GERD)
available from OECD’s Main Science and Technology Indicators database. Several missing
values are interpolated taking into account the historical evolution of national GDP. Again,
PIM is applied to the computation of R&D stocks. The initial stock is computed for the first
available year (1980), while the subsequent yearly depreciation rate is fixed at 15 percent.
In the case of non-OECD countries, I use the indicator GERD as a percentage of GDP
(UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks, Eurostat and national statistics) and values for total GDP
in constant 2000 $ PPP (World Development Indicators) to construct the yearly flows of
GERD; the R&D stocks are computed using PIM and an identical depreciation rate.
International technological spillovers from trade and FDI
As a result of trade and investment activities, both domestic and foreign intermediate goods
can be employed in a country i ’s production. The range of domestic intermediate goods pro-
duced can be estimated as the cumulative stock of R&D expenditures while the unobserved
range of foreign intermediates is captured by a flow weighted foreign R&D matrix, where the
flows are bilateral imports and inward FDI. This bears the assumption that FDI and trade
are complements rather than substitutes. There are several weighting schemes used in the
literature; however, the results are quite robust regardless of the type employed (Krammer,
2010). As a result, I opt for similar weights to those of Ciruelos and Wang (2005):
Sfmit =
n∑
j=1
Mijt∑
iXjit
∗ SFjt (10)
Sffit =
n∑
j=1
Fijt∑
i Fjit
∗ SFjt (11)
where i represents the home or recipient country, while j is the foreign one. In equation
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(10) the fraction inside the summation represents the share of country i’s imports (Mijt) from
j from the total exports of country j (
∑
iXjit) in year t multiplied by the stock of foreign
R&D of j (SFjt). Thus, the greater the R&D intensity of partner countries and the more
intensive trade flows are, the greater the potential spillovers will be for the recipient country.
A similar procedure is applied for FDI spillovers in equation (11). Hence, according to these
equations, the higher the share of goods and inward FDI a country j receives from a developed
and R&D intensive nation i, the bigger j’s spillover will be. Data on trade flows comes from
the IMF DOTS database, while FDI data are drawn from the World Development Indicators
(World Bank), complemented by UNCTAD statistics. The foreign R&D stocks are computed
using PIM and R&D investments from Main Science and Technology Indicators (OECD).
Therefore, the R&D stocks of 25 OECD countries serve as a base for spillovers for both
developed Western European as well as transition countries.
4.4 Institutional quality
In practice, measuring institutions is a daunting task. The three most common ways to quan-
tify institutions across countries include: (1) data from surveys of international investors;
(2) the governance and ease of doing business data sets developed by the World Bank; (3)
political aspects that usually present little variance on the short term and capture the essence
of institutional settings of a country. In this paper, I adopt a mixed approach that relies on
secondary sources of data and employs a battery of variables to capture the complexity of
formal institutional aspects in a country. The variables considered are described below.
Governance
Data on various aspects of governance in a country come from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI), a project run by the World Bank, which covers 212 countries and territories
between since 1996. The data, collected from surveys of enterprises, experts and citizens,
is especially useful when dealing with developing countries where information is scarce. I
construct an average governance indicator (avg gov) from the six components available,
namely Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and the Control of Corruption. These six
components receive equal weights in the aggregate governance variable.
Economic freedom
Economic freedom encompasses the rights of individuals over their labor and property with
minimal governmental restrictions and interventions. The Heritage Foundation’s Index of
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Economic Freedom is an extremely useful tool for international comparisons on these issues
covering in total 183 countries. The measure considered in this paper is an aggregated indi-
cator (econ freed) which includes 10 qualitative and quantitative factors with equal weights:
property rights, freedom from corruption), fiscal freedom, government spending, business
freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom and financial
freedom.
Intellectual property rights protection
With the rise of global trade agreements, research on the effect of international regulation
of property rights (IPR) has received a lot of attention, and to this day, its policy implica-
tions remain controversial, especially in the area of developing nations. To measure IPR,
I use data from Park (2008), which proposed an updated (up to 2005) and extended (in-
cludes 122 countries) intellectual property rights index (ipr) that quantifies the adoption of
stronger patent laws and the composition of patent rights. This index provides a compa-
rable quantitative indication of the strength of the patent systems across countries and it
comprises five different scores for coverage, international treaties membership, duration of
protection, enforcement and restrictions regarding patenting (Park, 2008). The original data
has a five year frequency, and the indicator used in this paper employed yearly IPR values
obtained through interpolation, under the assumption that IP regimes change slower than
the proposed 5-year window.
Ease of doing business
The ”ease of doing business” index (World Bank) provides a general assessment of a coun-
try’s business environment and its pro-business institutional elements and reforms. It encom-
passes several categories that include starting a business, dealing with construction permits,
employing workers, registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, protecting investors,
international trade, contract enforcement and business closing procedures. I employ a nor-
malized version of this indicator (bus ease) that equals the maximum number of procedures
required to open up a business across all countries minus the number of procedures in the
country of interest divided by 30 (days). Thus, higher value of this indicator suggest better
or easier regimes of doing business.
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Variable Name Summary Statistics Panel Unit Root Tests
Obs Mean St.Dev Min Max LLC IPS H
logF log total factor productivity 910 2.00 0.43 0.68 2.82 20.33 -0.63 16.11***
logSfm log trade spillovers 940 5.37 2.53 0.00 10.13 17.95 -0.84 11.25***
logSff log FDI spillovers 933 4.17 2.95 0.00 11.29 18.01 1.46 9.69***
logSd log domestic R&D 943 8.38 2.21 3.75 12.71 10.64 0.39 16.01***
avg gov average governance score 349 2.33 0.98 0.00 3.77 -7.58*** 0.49 15.89***
econ freed average freedom score 436 60.95 10.50 31.50 82.20 -8.80*** -0.47 13.81***
ipr IPR index 395 3.78 0.81 1.20 4.67 -2.31** 1.08 8.91***
bus ease ease doing business 550 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.46 -1.12 -0.87 10.56***
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and panel unit root tests (1990-2009)
Notes: All tests include individual effects and individual linear trends. In their specification up to 4 lags were considered based
on the Schwarz selection criterion. Hadri (H) is the only test which has stationarity as the null hypothesis, all the others have
non-stationarity. Hadri allows also for heteroskedastic error terms.; †, ** and *** indicate variables that are significant at the
10%, 5% and respectively 1% levels
Estimated equations Pedroni Tests
Panel v Panel ρ Group ρ
logF logSd 0.06 1.40 3.17***
logF logSfm logSff logSd 6.87*** 7.03*** 9.67***
logF logSfm logSff logSd avg gov 11.08*** 4.17*** 4.98***
logF logSfm logSff logSd econ freed 23.68*** 7.72*** 9.60***
logF logSfm logSff logSd ipr 3.30*** 10.46*** 12.82***
logF logSfm logSff logSd bus ease 13.76*** 8.65*** 8.33***
Table 2: Panel cointegration tests(1990–2009)
Notes: The null hypothesis for these tests is no cointegration; the lag selection is automatic based on Schwarz information
criterion and the tests use a Newey-West bandwidth selection with Bartlett kernel; †, ** and *** indicate variables that are
significant at the 10%, 5% and respectively 1% levels
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Econometric issues
Given the close movements of all these aggregated time series, one cannot ignore the problem
of spurious regression that might arise when dealing with non-stationary variables. Thus,
I explore this issues via several panel unit root tests proposed by Im et al. (2003); Levin
et al. (2002) and Hadri (2000), which are superior to the ones based on individual time
series, especially when these series are not very long (see Table 1)1. The results of these
tests indicate that most of these variables are non-stationary. Hence, to estimate the effect
of international R&D spillovers via FDI and trade on productivity and the impact of various
institutional settings, one needs to find a cointegrating relationship between them.
In this case, panel cointegration is the most appropriate way to deal with I(1) series,
1Two variables do not possess a time dimension: expropriation risk and institutional origins. Thus, I do
not perform time series analysis for these variables.
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 logF 1.00
2 logSd 0.35 1.00
3 logSfm 0.59 0.76 1.00
4 logSff 0.67 0.38 0.63 1.00
5 avg gov 0.79 0.50 0.68 0.60 1.00
6 ipr 0.42 0.40 0.65 0.60 0.49 1.00
7 bus ease 0.45 -0.20 0.26 0.38 0.20 0.37 1.00
8 econ freed 0.76 0.17 0.49 0.58 0.81 0.38 0.18 1.00
Table 3: Pairwise correlations for main variables (1990-2009)
as opposed to other methods, such as first differencing, which discards some valuable in-
formation in the process. To test whether there is a cointegrating relationship between the
variables in the model, I employ the three most powerful tests for a small t large N sample,
proposed by Pedroni (1999)2. Their values and significance levels are reported in Table 2.
Overall, in most cases, I reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, so that the least-
square estimator becomes ”super-consistent”3. This makes it suitable for regression analysis
using non-stationary variables.
5.2 Analysis and results
Given the availability of data across variables (e.g., governance data is not available prior to
1996) and countries considered, the final dataset has an unbalanced panel structure. Pair-
wise correlations between main variables are reported in Table 3. They indicate several
potential collinearity issues between IPR, governance and, to a lesser extent, economic free-
dom, and the computed measures of spillovers. Additional collinearity tests using variance
inflation factors (VIFs) and other diagnostic tests suggest that the risk of multicollinear-
ity is increased significantly by the introduction of moderation (interaction) effects in the
regressions and simultaneous consideration of all institutional proxies, as they exacerbate
the collinearity between our variables of interest. In these cases VIF values well exceed the
recommended threshold in the literature (10) and the reliability of the coefficients becomes
questionable. Therefore, to minimize these potential estimation pitfalls, I will run the anal-
ysis bringing in one institutional proxy at a time, center the interaction variables, and run
separate regressions for developed and transition economies in each scenario.
2These seven residual-based tests are based on the null hypothesis of no cointegration and allow for
heterogeneous cross sectional variance. Pedroni (2004) runs various Monte Carlo experiments and suggests
that the parametric group-ρ statistic and panel-ρ statistic appear to have the highest power, followed by the
panel-v statistic.
3Converges faster to the true estimate of the parameter of the population than in the case of stationary
variables associated with the usual OLS requirements
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Throughout the analyses, I test various specifications using the full sample of 47 countries
(all) and disentangle developed Western economies (wec) from Eastern European and Central
Asian transition countries (trc) to identify potential differences in terms of how spillovers
and institutions impact productivity levels4. By using a fixed effects model I deal with this
unobserved heterogeneity and isolate the effect of the variables of interest.
I start with a simple model (Model 1, Table 4) which looks at the direct impact of
institutional quality, proxied by average governance scores, while controlling for the influence
of R&D spillovers from trade and FDI activities, domestic investments in R&D, as well as
other sources of unobserved heterogeneity across countries by using a fixed effects model.
Both sources of spillovers and the domestic R&D stock contribute to productivity growth.
However, upon consideration of institutional features (e.g., governance) the domestic R&D
stock becomes insignificant and the spillovers from FDI become significant at only 10 percent,
given the high correlation between them. Average governance is correlated robustly with
productivity levels across countries and a one point increase in this indicator translates into
an average of 11% increase in productivity. Model 2 tests the indirect effects of governance of
spillovers from trade activities. The interaction coefficient is negative and highly statistically
significant (at 1 percent) suggesting that greater governance levels reduce the impact of
spillovers on domestic productivity of countries. Similar effects, although a bit lower in
magnitude, are obtained in Model 3, where I test the interaction between governance quality
and spillovers from FDI. Finally, results hold upon introduction of all these interactions
(Model 4) despite the inherent collinearity issues. Overall the results support my hypotheses
1 and 3b regarding the direct and indirect effects of institutions on productivity
Next, I seek to distinguish the effects of institutions contingent on the level of economic
development, and following my second and fourth hypotheses, I examine these questions in
the case of two subsamples of countries: Western European (wec) developed economies, and
Central Asian and Eastern European less developed ones, commonly referred to as transition
countries (trc). Model 5 suggests that institutions still bear positive effects on productivity
even in the case of developed nations. However, the indirect effects are both smaller in size
and less prominent statistically. Only the interaction between trade spillovers and gover-
nance is statistically significant at 10% providing weak support for Hypothesis 3a. Similarly,
the coefficients for direct effects of spillovers on productivity are much weaker throughout
4Besides the obvious differences between transition and developed economies, there is also significant
heterogeneity within both groups. In Western economies, the core of EU-15 led by Germany, France and the
UK, is more productive than the Southern peripheries, represented by Greece, Spain and Portugal. Similarly,
countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, etc.) are the forerunners
of the transition pack, while Central Asian states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and others) are still
fine-tuning their recipes for success. Moreover, it would be difficult to justify that composition or in R&D
intensity of trade and FDI inflows of transition and Western European nations are similar.
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the estimations (Model 5-8). Therefore, domestic R&D efforts appear to be the main driver
of productivity in Western Europe. In contrast, transition economies appear to benefit much
more from exposure to trade and FDI (Model 9-12). Especially in the case of FDI spillovers,
transition economies appear to gain significantly, likely driven by a larger technological dis-
tance between incoming MNEs and domestic incumbents, yielding a larger potential for
spillovers. Good governance is associated with higher productivity for these countries as
well, although its impact is not greater overall (thus, not confirming my second hypothesis).
However, both trade and FDI related spillovers appear to be negatively moderated by gov-
ernance quality, suggesting that as transition countries improve their governance structure,
the impact of spillovers on productivity is diminishing. These results are consistent with
hypotheses 3b and 4.
Models 13 through 24 perform similar tests using a different institutional variable, namely
the average score for economic freedom of a country, proposed by the Heritage Foundation’s
Index of Economic Freedom (Table 5). Again, I start with a pooled sample of all 47 countries
and show that in general, countries equipped with more economic freedom are also benefiting
from higher levels of productivity (Models 13-16). Moreover, the results support again
hypothesis 3b according to which institutional quality moderates negatively the influence of
spillovers on productivity. Furthermore, I compare these results in the case of developed and
transition economies and find for Western Europe, both economic freedom and spillovers
have marginal effects on productivity. The main driver of the latter remains domestic R&D
efforts. The interaction terms between institutional quality and spillovers are very small
in magnitude and not statistically significant. Oppositely, both spillovers (especially trade
related ones) and economic freedom have a strong statistical influence on productivity in
transition countries. Moreover, the interaction terms indicate that for transition countries
greater levels of economic freedom diminishes the effect of spillovers, as they are not able to
freely imitate foreign technologies. These results are very similar to the ones obtained using
governance quality as a measure of institutions.
Another variable that has received a significant amount of attention in the literature is
the strength of IPR regimes. In Table 6 regressions 25 through 36 synthesize these results. In
terms of direct effects, a higher IPR regime is associated with higher productivity, especially
in developed economies (Models 29-32). A one point improvement on the scale of IPR rights
will result in a 19.72% increase in productivity levels in developed nations and about 19%
in transition ones. Therefore, the effects appear similar in magnitude for the two sets of
countries, although for transition economies the statistical significance tends to be lower.
When analyzing the interaction between IPR regimes and the spillover variables from FDI
and trade the results are opposite to each other for the two sets of countries. In the case
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of Western economies, interactions are all positive suggesting that stronger IPR regimes
coupled with larger inflows of FDI and trade will boost domestic productivity. However,
transition economies exhibit a negative interaction between the strength of IPR regimes and
their ability to harness spillovers for productivity growth (Models 34-36). These findings
suggest that for developed nations high IPR institutions are associated with higher effects
of spillovers while for transition economies the opposite is true. A possible explanation is
the structural difference in composition of FDI and trade flows between the two sets of
countries. Moreover, these findings are consistent with previous results (Falvey et al., 2006)
and arguments in the literature (Grossman and Lai, 2002; Chaudhuri et al., 2003). Although
the negative effects might be dampened across industries with losers and winners on both
sides (Smarzynska-Javorcik, 2004), overall there seems to be a negative effect on aggregated
productivity for transition economies.
Table 7 concludes the empirical exercise by employing a measure of business friendliness
(i.e., easiness to do business, or how pro-business the institutional environment is), which
should be especially salient for FDI-related spillovers. Given that trade and FDI flows could
act both as substitutes and complements, the impact of easiness to do business on trade
spillovers is not clear even in theory. These results of these interactions (Models 37 to 48) are
in accordance with the view that trade and investments are imperfect complements. Overall,
the quality of the business environment appears to be weakly correlated with productivity
improvements (Models 37-40), especially when the moderating effects are not considered. In
terms of direct effects, it is clear that developed (Western) economies tend to benefit from
it (Models 41-44) to a greater extent then transition economies (Models 45-48). However, in
terms of indirect effects, interactions between ease of doing business and both trade-related
and FDI-related spillovers are positive and statistically significant for both sets of countries,
suggesting that the benefits of spillovers are clearly affected by institutional progress in this
domain. Overall these results support my postulated hypotheses regarding the generic direct
and indirect effects of institutions on productivity.
To formally test Hypotheses 2 and 4 I run additional regressions with the same spec-
ifications across all institutional proxies and allowing for interaction effect with a dummy
variable representing transition countries. These regressions are not reported in the paper
in detail due to space constraints, but they are synthesized in the Conclusions section (Ta-
ble 8). Overall, I find no significant difference in magnitude between the direct effects of
institutions on productivity across the two groups of countries (transition and developed
economies). However, in terms of moderating effects these tend to be significantly larger for
transition countries, especially those via spillovers from trade, in accordance with my fourth
hypothesis.
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Finally, I perform several robustness checks to test the validity of these results. First, I
analyze also the effects of direct institutional origins and outcomes on productivity and in-
teractions with spillovers (only trade spillovers for simplicity). These results are not reported
in the paper due to space constraints, but are available upon request. In terms of origins of
the legal systems, Western Europe hosts four legal systems (French, German, Scandinavian
and Anglo-Saxon), while the Eastern European and Central Asian nations replaced their
socialist system and re-adopted their pre-WWII judicial systems (either French or German
based). The estimation results suggest that countries with French based legal systems enjoy
positive effects both in the full, developed and transition sample , while on aggregate those
with German legal tradition have lower spillovers, except when these countries are developed
Western European states, like Germany or Austria. Throughout these regressions, Scandi-
navian tradition is positively correlated with spillovers, while Common Law has the opposite
effect.
As for institutional outcomes, I examine the effects of expropriation risk using the index
developed by McArthur and Sachs (2001), the infant mortality statistics and a measure
of human capital (i.e., tertiary education) both provided by the UN Statistics. Developed
countries with a low expropriation risk enjoy higher spillovers from both trade and FDI,
while for transition countries things are ambiguous and the coefficients are not statistically
significant, suggesting a less robust relationship. Low infant mortality, a direct result of
institutional advancements in less developed countries, has strong positive effects on both
productivity and the relationship with spillovers in the case of all countries. Besides affecting
directly the labor force of a country, this measure also reflects indirectly the availability of
human capital that ensures a successful absorption of technological content from abroad.
Lastly, countries with larger population with tertiary education have higher productivity
and are able to utilize better the potential spillovers from trade and FDI. The statistical
evidence as well and the magnitude of the effects are more important in the case of transition
countries, where technical education is a strong heritage from past decades and an important
component of absorptive capacity that compensates for lower R&D investments.
Secondly, I perform a couple of tests regarding methodological choices made in this anal-
ysis. I test for non-linear direct effects of institutions on productivity, and find evidence of
non-linear relationships only in the case for the full sample only in the case of institutions
related to economic freedom. Moreover, I perform factor analysis on the four formal institu-
tions considered. The four variables load less than satisfactory upon considering up to two
factors, and the values for Cronbach’s alpha (0.21 and respectively 0.31) confirm the below
standard reliability of these composite indicators, partly due to significant decreases in the
sample size upon simultaneous consideration of these factors (below 100 observations per
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group of countries). Despite these pitfalls, the results of these regressions confirm the core
results of the paper (direct positive effects of institutions on spillovers; positive weak mod-
eration of spillovers effects on productivity in the case of developed countries; negative and
stronger moderation of spillovers effects on productivity in the case of transition countries).
6 Conclusions
Productivity and economic growth remain at the heart of any policy agenda, especially in
the wake of the crisis. Knowing that much of the variation in GDP and productivity differ-
entials across countries can be attributed to innovation and new technologies, many policies
seek to maximize technological benefits from both domestic (i.e., R&D efforts within the
country) and external sources (i.e., via spillovers) that are accessible through international
trade and investment flows (Krammer, 2010). In parallel, formal and informal institutional
settings have been suggested to serve as ”deep” determinants of innovation, productivity,
economic performance and international interactions across countries (Tebaldi and Elmslie,
2008; Dias and Tebaldi, 2012; Dollar and Kray, 2003; Dixit, 2009; Henisz and Swaminathan,
2008). Despite numerous examinations of the effect of institutions on economic growth, we
lack sufficient knowledge on the mechanisms through which institutions affect growth, their
relationship with productivity and foreign technological spillovers, as well as their impact
across different development levels and institutional elements.
Following some of these questions, this study develops a theoretical framework that ac-
commodates the direct and moderating effect of institutions on productivity, synthesized in
four theoretical hypotheses. It tests these hypotheses in an empirical setting that includes
20 developed countries from Western Europe and 27 transition countries from Central Asian
and Eastern Europe over the period 1990 to 2009. Moreover, it examines two potential
channels for spillovers (i.e., imports and inward FDI), which have been consistently iden-
tified as important sources of spillovers, and a battery of institutional variables. This set
of institutional proxies includes the core of formal elements of institutions (e.g., governance
quality, economic freedom, intellectual property rights protection, ease of doing business),
complemented by historical origins of legal systems (e.g., French, German, Scandinavian and
Anglo-Saxon), and several institutional variables that can be linked directly to growth (e.g.,
infant mortality, availability of skilled human capital).
Overall, my empirical results confirm that the effects of institutions on productivity vary
across development levels and institutional proxies considered (Table 8). First, in terms
of the direct effect, good institutions, regardless of operationalization choices, appear to
impact positively productivity levels (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, some of these effects are
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Institutional proxies Direct effect Moderating effect Moderating effect
on productivity via trade spillovers via FDI spillovers
Institutions
1. Governance + (all) -(trc) -(trc)
2. Economic freedom + (trc) - (trc)
3. IPR + (all) + (wec); - (trc) +(wec); -(trc)
4. Ease doing business + (wec) + (all) + (all)
Institutional outcomes
5. Expropriation risk - (wec)
6. Tertiary education + (all) + (all) + (all)
7. Low infant mortality + (all) + (all) + (all)
Table 8: Summary of results
Note: This table lists only statistically significant results and the sign (+ or -) of the estimated direct or moderating effect
of these variables; wec refers to Western European countries, while trc refers to transition countries from Eastern Europe and
Central Asia. Shaded shells represent cases in which the estimated coefficients are larger (statistically significant)in the case of
transition countries than developed nations.
prevalent in the case of transition economies (governance, economic freedom), while others
(ease of doing business and expropriation risk) work better for developed countries. Second,
consistent with my theoretical conjectures, I find that institutional quality moderates the
effects of foreign technological spillovers on productivity. However, these indirect effects vary
across institutional elements and countries considered. Institutions that regulate the business
environment (ease of doing business) appear to interact positively with both trade and FDI
spillovers in determining productivity levels, confirming my Hypothesis 3a. Likewise, IPR
regulations have positive moderating effects in the case of developed Western economies, but
negative ones for transition countries (Hypothesis 3b). These negative moderation effects are
also found for governance quality and economic freedom in the case of transition economies.
All these findings show that both the direct and indirect effects of institutional qual-
ity on productivity are heterogeneous across different institutional variables and groups of
countries. This translates into different implications and policy advice for developing and
transition countries, often caught in autocratic regimes that do not necessarily envision R&D
investments and innovation as the way forward. With respect to the effect of different sources
of spillovers, trade seems to play a primary role, while the effect of inward FDI on domestic
productivity is much smaller. Transition countries benefit more from trade related spillovers
than Western Europe. Besides imports, the former also harness the technological spillovers
from FDI, due to differences between their domestic levels and that of multinationals coming
in. However, in the case of transition countries, institutional quality has a negative modera-
tion effect on the relationship between productivity and spillovers. This could be explained
by a diminished scope for imitation of foreign technologies resulting in lower absorptive ca-
pacity of domestic firms, an increase in competition with foreign firms for existing financial
resources, and a less-appealing destination for resource- and cost reducing- FDI as a result
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of higher legislative standards (e.g., labor, environmental issues, etc.). Streamlined legisla-
tion (greater ease of doing business) is the only institutional variable which has a universal
positive impact on both productivity and the relationship between it and spillovers. Thus,
transparent and lighter legislation (e.g., the number of processes to start a business, hiring
employees, paying taxes etc.) appears to stimulate the positive effect of both trade- and
FDI-related spillovers across all countries. Finally, IPR rules appear to have a positive effect
only for developed countries with already significant stocks of knowledge and technologies, as
a result of historically sustained R&D efforts. For transition countries, high IPR standards
appear to stimulate more domestic innovation, but on the other hand, reduce the impact
of foreign technological spillovers by closing the possibilities of imitation of foreign products
and technologies.
The importance of institutions is also confirmed by several supplementary analyses carried
out with other institutional measures that focus on the historical heritage (i.e., legal sys-
tems) and institutional outcomes in a country. In terms of institutional heritage, in Western
economies, having a German or Scandinavian based system is correlated with higher produc-
tivity; however, transition countries that have a German based institutional system tend to
do worse than those who are French-based. This suggests that the effect of legal origins on
productivity is potentially contingent on other factors, which are not explored in this study.
High expropriation risk does not hinder the flows of trade and FDI into transition economies,
however, in developed nations it has the expected negative effect. Potential explanations for
this finding are the resource endowments existing in many transition economies, the exis-
tence of other channels (e.g., similar culture, foreign aid) that mitigates the negative effects
of expropriation risk in the case of less developed economies, and the construction of the
index which lacks time variance. Having a low infant mortality rate proves to be a strong
predictor of institutional quality and has significant positive effect both on productivity and
spillovers, enhancing the contribution of the latter by spurring absorptive capacity. Simi-
larly, tertiary education is a strong contributor both in the case of transition and developed
countries. Overall, these results confirm the effects of institutions on productivity, both
directly and via technological spillovers.
While this study advances our knowledge of some aspects regarding the relationship be-
tween institutions on productivity, it has limitations, which can serve a starting point for
future research. First, this study is grounded in the economic tradition of examining formal
aspects of institutions that are commonly related to legislative measures that set the ”rules
of the game”. An interesting addition to the literature would be to develop an integrative
framework for institutional analysis, one that incorporates also the effects of informal insti-
tutions on productivity and economic growth. Previous studies have examined the general
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impact of informal settings such as cultural values on innovation and growth. However, their
generality and prescriptions remain limited. Second, this type of empirical analysis could
benefit from a sustained effort to develop new measures of institutional quality, ones that
maximize both time and cross-country variation. In this study I have considered four of
the most common institutional proxies in the literature. However, the availability of data
remains an issue that could be significantly improved through development of new and better
institutional measures. Thirdly, follow-up analyses should consider enlarging the number of
countries in the dataset to take advantage of greater differentials in terms of institutional
and productivity dynamics. In this respect, countries in South-East Asia, Africa or the
Middle East present themselves as a propitious ground for empirical studies. Fourth, this
work focuses only on direct and indirect effects, although preliminary tests revealed that the
effects of some institutional variables appear to be non-linear. An interesting question for
future research would be to investigate closely the non-linearity of these relationships across
a wide range of development levels. Finally, the concept of institutions is a complex and
multifaceted one, evolving slowly over time and intrinsically related to changes in both tech-
nological and economic realm. Future research is needed to examine the inverse relationship
between economic and technological progress and institutional upgrades.
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